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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (j) (1994).

Pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1994), this case was poured over to this
Court by the Utah Supreme Court.

This Court has jurisdiction of

this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1994).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Defendant and Appellee Lynn Transportation Co., Inc.
("Lynn") is satisfied with the statements of the issues presented
in Appellant's brief as issues 4 through 10. However, the first
three issues identified by Appellant were not raised, briefed or
argued below, and were therefore not preserved for this appeal.
Accordingly, Lynn identifies the following additional issue on
appeal:
1.

Did Appellant preserve the issue of whether the

written agreement between Kirk H. Mower and Lynn and dated April
12, 1990 was an integrated contract?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of
material fact exists and the moving party is entiled to judgment
as a matter of law.

Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civ. Pro.; Hiaains

v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993).

The standard

of review in this Court for a trial court's granting of a summary
126196.1

judgment is correctness.

Hiaains, 855 P.2d at 235. The trial

court's decision granting summary judgment can be affirmed based
on any theory, even if such theory was not applied by the trial
court.

Id.

The Court will not, however,

reverse the trial

court's decision based on theories not presented to the trial
court.

Franklin Fin.v. New Empire Dev. Co.. 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah

1983) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff and Appellant Kirk H. Mower ("Mower") contracted
to be a truck driver for Defendant and Appellee Lynn
Transportation Co., Inc. ("Lynn").

R. 298. Mower owned his

truck and was an independent contractor.

R. 298. While driving

a load for Lynn, he was injured when his truck ran off the road.
R. 301. Mower had no workers' compensation insurance for his
company.

R. 3 01.

He filed suit against Lynn and its insurance

agent, Defendant and Appellee Alexander & Alexander, Inc.
("Alexander"), claiming that a single "X" mark on a form provided
by Alexander to Lynn and filled out by Mower obligated Lynn and
Alexander to obtain workers' compensation insurance for Mower.
R. 300. He contended this form imposed this obligation
notwithstanding his written contract with Lynn, which
unambiguously required Mower to obtain such insurance and to
indemnify Lynn for such claims.
126196.1

R. 3 01.
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After considerable discovery and indeed, after Mower had
certified that he was ready for trial, R. 385-386, Defendants
moved for summary judgment.

They submitted the contract between

Lynn and Mower (executed on April 12, 1990) (the "Agreement") as
undisputed evidence.

R. 397 & 416-417.

In addition, defendants

submitted the following additional undisputed facts, which were
not disputed (except as noted) by Mower, R. 465:
1.

In April of 1990, when Mower applied to be a driver

for Lynn, Linda Granath of Lynn gave Mower a form to order
liability and bobtail insurance.

Defendants attached a copy of

that form to their motion, and cited to Ms- Granath's deposition.
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment
("Defendants' Memo"), R. 398; Granath Deposition, R. 419-421.
2.

The form given Mower by Granath, in addition to boxes

for bobtail and liability insurance, had a box at the bottom for
"Workers' Compensation," which Mower checked.

Defendants' Memo,

R. 398; Granath Deposition, R. 418.
3.

The form was completed by Mower prior to the time

when Mower signed the written contract with Lynn. Defendants'
Memo, R. 398. Although Mower attempted to dispute this fact by
quibbling that it was signed "as part of the same transaction,"
Mower submitted no evidence in support of this contention, and in
fact, he contradicted this argument in his deposition, by
126196 1
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testifying that the form was signed before the Agreement. Mower
Deposition, R. 467 & 424. Defendants attached excerpts from
Mower's deposition to their motion.
4.

Prior to applying at Lynn Transportation, Mower had

known Linda Granath and was friendly with her.

Defendants' Memo,

R. 398.
5.

Mower had a single, three-to-five minute conversation

with Linda Granath concerning insurance generally, including
workers' compensation insurance.

Defendants' Memo, R. 3 98; Mower

Deposition, R. 427, 428 & 434.
6.

Mower had no other conversations concerning insurance

with any representative of Lynn or Alexander prior to his
accident on July 28, 1990. Defendants' Memo, R. 399; Mower
Deposition, R. 427 & 428.
1.

Linda Granath did not say she would obtain workers'

compensation insurance for Mower's business. Mower admitted this
in his deposition and did not dispute this fact with any evidence
in the record.

Defendants' Memo, R. 399; Mower Deposition, R.

427.
8.

Defendants also submitted that, according to Mower,

Linda Granath indicated that she would send in the form and
Alexander would compute Mower's premium.
399; Mower Deposition, R. 426-427.
126196.1
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Defendants' Memo, R.

9.

Defendants also submitted, and Mower did not dispute,

that Ms. Granath faxed and mailed the form as filled out by Mower
to Alexander.
10.

Defendants' Memo, R. 3 98.

Mower never discussed the cost of workers'

compensation insurance, other than the fact that it would be
expensive, with any representative of Lynn or Alexander,
including Linda Granath.

Defendants' Memo, R. 3 99; Mower

Deposition, R. 426-427.
11.

Mower never discussed how many employees he

anticipated his business would have with any representative of
Lynn or Alexander, including Linda Granath.

Defendants' Memo, R.

399; Mower Deposition, R. 427.
12.

Mower never discussed the issue of whether he, as

opposed to merely his employees, would be covered under the
supposed workers' compensation insurance policy.

Defendants'

Memo, R. 399; Mower Deposition, R. 427-428.
13.

Mower knew that the number of employees to be covered

under a workers' compensation policy was important for purposes
of making an application for such insurance.

Defendants' Memo,

R. 3 99; Mower Deposition, R. 431.
14.

Although amounts for "insurance" were deducted from

the checks Mower was paid for his services as an independent
contractor, Mower had "no idea" what sort of insurance these
126196 1
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deductions were for.

Defendants' Memo, R. 400; Mower Deposition,

R. 429.
15.

It was likewise undisputed, for purposes of the

motion, that Mower was injured on the job on or about July 28,
1990.

Defendants' Memo, R. 400; Amended Complaint, 1 29, R. 301.
16.

On July 22, 1992, Timothy C. Allen, presiding

administrative law judge for the Industrial Commission of Utah,
ruled that "Kirk Mower was an independent contractor and not an
employee of Lynn Transportation."

Marv Mower v. Lvnn

Transportation, Case No. 9100271 (Industrial Commission of Utah)
(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated July 22,
1992).

Mower has never disputed that status in this action.

Defendants' Memo, R. 400.
17.
proprietor.

Mower operated M-T Transport, his dba, as a sole
Defendants' Memo, R. 400; Mower Interrogatory

Response, R. 445.
18.

No written notice was provided by Mower to the

Industrial Commission or any insurance carrier that he, as sole
proprietor, was to be covered by any workers' compensation
insurance policy applicable to his business.

Defendants' Memo,

R. 401.
Based on these undisputed facts, Defendants moved for
summary judgment.
126196.1

Central to Defendants' arguments in their
6

motion for summary judgment were the following provisions in the
undisputed Agreement between Mower and Lynn:
The Contractor [Mower] shall maintain in force and
effect Workman's Compensation Insurance (with All
States Endorsement) to the full extent of statutory
limits of all states in which work will be
performed pursuant to the terms of this Agreement
covering itself, its drivers, driver's helpers and
laborers employed by it in the performance of this
Agreement, and shall furnish CARRIER [Lynn] with a
copy of policy evidencing such coverage or a
Certificate of Insurance in lieu thereof.
CONTRACTOR agrees to protect, defend, indemnify,
and hold CARRIER harmless from and against any
claim, loss or damage brought or alleged by
CONTRACTOR or its employees against CARRIER for any
injury, including death to CONTRACTOR or its
employees resulting from the performance of this
Agreement.
R. 416.

In addition, it is undisputed that the Agreement further

provided:
This Agreement constitutes the entire Agreement and
understanding between the parties and shall not be
modified, altered, changed or amended in any
respect unless in writing and signed by both
parties.
R. 417.
Lynn and Alexander moved for summary judgment on the basis
that the contract assigned the duty to obtain workers'
compensation insurance to Mower, and that his attempts to shift
this obligation on to defendants were therefore legally
insufficient.

In fact, Lynn maintained that the contract obliged

Mower to indemnify it from the very claim he was asserting
126196 i
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against Lynn.

In addition, Defendants moved on the basis that

Mower, as a sole proprietor of an independent business, would not
have been eligible for workers' compensation benefits, so that
the policy Mower claimed Defendants should have bought on his
behalf would not have covered him in any event.1
Judge Moffat granted the Defendants' motion for summary
judgment on both bases, as well as granting the Defendants'
motions to strike the Affidavits of Jerry Anderegg, a supposed
expert in insurance whose affidavits were submitted by Mower in
R. 550-553.2

an attempt to salvage his case.

In a later

motion, Lynn moved for summary judgment on its counterclaims,
submitting as undisputed the amount owing on account from Mower
and its attorney's fees expended in defending the action.
595-606.

R.

Mower stipulated that he did not dispute the amounts or

reasonableness of these claims, R. 591-594, but argued that the
Agreement did not permit indemnification in this case.

R. 617-

1

Defendants also moved to dismiss Mower's claims for
indemnification from potential claims by Mower's common-law wife,
who Mower contended was an employee hurt in a separate on-the-job
injury. R. 412-413. After the Industrial Commission rejected
Mary Mower's workers' compensation claims, Mower abandoned this
claim, and in fact went on later to contend that he was the only
employee of his company. R. 473; see R. 513.
2

Mower has not appealed the granting of the motions to
strike the Anderegg Affidavits, having failed to identify or
brief any issue regarding the trial court's granting the motion
to strike.
126196.1
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620.

The trial court rejected this argument, granted Lynn's

motion and directed the entry of judgment in favor of Lynn in the
amount of $34,398.52.

R. 633-635.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

This case concerns the enforcement of a clear contractual
provision assigning the duty to obtain workers' compensation
insurance for Mower's company to Mower.

The contract is

integrated on its face, and there was no evidence submitted below
to rebut the presumption of its integration.

In fact, Mower has

repeatedly conceded that his contract with Lynn required him to
obtain the workers' compensation insurance.

Contrary contractual

duties cannot be implied in the face of the written Agreement's
clear provision.

There is therefore no genuine dispute

concerning the contractual apportionment of that duty to Mower.
There is likewise no issue of fact concerning the
equitable doctrine of estoppel.

Mower's alleged "reliance" on

the defendants' actions and inactions was not, as a matter of
law, reasonable.

More importantly, the estoppel doctrine could

only be applied to excuse Mower from his contractual obligation
if Mower was without fault in this situation.

Mower clearly

bears significant fault for his failure to comply with his
contractual commitments and obtain workers' compensation
insurance.
126196.1
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Mower's tort and other common law claims cannot alter the
contractual duties established by the Agreement between Mower and
Lynn.

The duties here arise out of a contractual relationship,

and imposing contrary tort duties on Lynn would deprive Lynn of
its contractual rights, and frustrate the ability of all
commercial parties to govern their respective business
responsibilities to one another through contract. Moreover,
because Mower's Agreement with Lynn requires him to indemnify
Lynn for the very claim he asserts here, any tort claim amounts
to a zero-sum proposition:

Mower is contractually obligated to

repay Lynn for every dollar Lynn is required to pay for Mower's
tort claims.
In addition, even if contract or tort law imposed a duty
on Lynn to obtain workers' compensation insurance for Mower's
company, Mower's injuries would not have been covered under such
a policy, so Mower is undamaged by Lynn's alleged failure to
obtain such a policy.

Mower is a sole proprietor of his

business, and would have had to affirmatively give notice to both
the insurance carrier and the Utah State Industrial Commission
prior to being covered under a workers' compensation policy.

It

is undisputed that Mower never gave such notice to anyone, so he
would not have been covered.

The damages he claims (measured by

the amount of workers' compensation benefits he would have
126196.1
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received under the policy he claims Lynn should have obtained for
him) equal zero.
Finally, the trial court correctly ordered the entry of
judgment against Mower and in favor of Lynn in the amount of
$34,3 98.52.

Properly interpreted, the indemnification clause in

this case encompasses all the claims asserted in this action by
Mower.
ARGUMENT
I.

THERE IS NO ISSUE CONCERNING THE TERMS OF MOWER'S CONTRACT
WITH LYNN.
A,

Mower Did Not Contest The Issue Of Integration Below.

Mower's first point on appeal asserts that the trial court
erred in holding that the parol evidence rule barred his claims
because issues of fact existed regarding the contract's
integration.

Mower did not raise this issue below.

On the

contrary, Mower conceded that his contract with Lynn required him
to obtain workers' compensation insurance.

Mower's Memorandum In

Response To Defendants' Joint Motion For Summary Judgment, R. 465
("Plaintiff admits he agreed at the time he was hired as an
independent contractor, that he would obtain workers' compensation
insurance . . . ") and at R. 469 ("all parties admit plaintiff had
a duty under the contract to carry worker's compensation
insurance11); Mower's Response to Motion For Summary Judgment on
Counterclaim, R. 618 ("The contract at issue places responsibility
126196.1
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on plaintiff to obtain worker's compensation insurance").

Rather

than contest the contractual theories asserted by defendants in
their motion for summary judgment, Mower chose to rely solely on
his estoppel and negligence theories.

R. 468 through 475. He

raised no argument, and pointed to no fact, concerning the written
Agreement's integration.
This Court will not consider arguments raised for the first
time on appeal.

Ona Intern. (USA) v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d

447, 455 n.31 (Utah 1993);

LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel Enter., 823

P.2d 479, 482-84 (Utah App. 1991); Barson v. E.R. Scaiibb & Sons,
Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 837-838 (Utah 1984); Franklin Fin, v. New
Empire Dev. Co.. 659 P.2d 1040, 1044-45 (Utah 1983).

At the trial

court level, Defendants' assertions that the Agreement was
integrated went unchallenged.3
arguments were conceded.

R. 404 & 508.

Indeed, those

It would be unfair to permit Mower to

change his legal position and now argue that the contract was
integrated.

3

Mower briefed only his estoppel theory (in an attempt to
defeat Defendants' reliance on the Agreement to bar Mower's
claims), his negligence theory, and argued that he had been
damaged by defendants' conduct. R. 465-475. He did not brief or
otherwise pursue his claims of fraud, agency, or Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 323. Thus, these theories have likewise not
been preserved for appeal. Ona Intern.. 850 P.2d at 455, n.31;
LeBaron & Assoc., 823 P.2d at 482-84; Barson, 682 P.2d at 837-38;
Franklin Fin., 659 P.2d at 1044-45.
126196 1
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B.

There Is No Issue of Fact Concerning the
Agreement's Integration.

Even if Mower had properly raised the legal issue of
integration below, the trial court was correct in concluding, based
on the undisputed facts before the court, that the Agreement was
integrated.

R. 551.

The Agreement at issue in this case contains

an express integration clause, in which Mower and Lynn agreed that:
This Agreement constitutes the entire Agreement and
understanding between the parties and shall not be
modified, altered, changed or amended in any respect
unless in writing and signed by the parties.
R. 417.

Such a declaration, unambiguous on its face, is regarded

by many authorities as conclusive proof of the issue of integration
by Professors Corbin and Williston.

4 S. Williston, Williston on

Contracts, § 633 (3d ed. 1961) ; A. L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts,
§ 578 at 403, 411 (1960) cited in, Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's
Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507, 512 (Utah App. 1988).

"By

limiting the contract to the provisions that are in writing, the
parties are definitely expressing an intention to nullify
antecedent understandings or agreements.
document a complete integration."

They are making the

Corbin, at 411. While Utah

apparently admits evidence to rebut such a written statement in a
contract, Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985)
(dicta), this same case also creates a presumption of integration
in such cases, requiring that a party claiming the contract is not
126196.1
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integrated come forward with evidence demonstrating as much.

Id.

No such evidence was offered by Mower.
Mower and Lynn agreed that their mutual responsibilities
were set forth in the written Contractor Operating Agreement; Mower
is now seeking to avoid that Agreement by contending that, instead
of the unambiguous provision in that Agreement assigning the
obligation to obtain workers' compensation insurance to Mower, an
ambiguous and previously executed insurance form imposed that duty
on Lynn.
The Agreement's terms are clear; it was Mower's job to
obtain workers' compensation insurance for his business, and the
parties intended that their written contract set forth all of their
obligations to each other.

To rely on conduct extrinsic to the

contract's clear written terms to impose a contrary duty on Lynn is
to ignore the express terms of the parties' contract, as well as
Mower's repeated admissions of that contractual duty.

In addition,

to ignore the Agreement's integration clause frustrates the entire
purpose of that clause and ignores the utter failure of Mower to
come forward with any evidence indicating that either party
intended that the integration clause means something other than
what it plainly says.

Mower did not demonstrate a genuine issue of

fact that the parties intended collateral representations to be
incorporated in their contract.
126196 1

The only theories raised by Mower
14

to avoid this obligation were estoppel and negligence theories.
This Court should not permit Mower to rewrite his legal theories on
appeal.
Here, the parties agreed that the written contract was an
integration of all prior negotiations.

Agreement, R. 417.

It was

intended as a complete statement of the relative responsibilities
of the contractor and the carrier.

Mower's factually unsupported

attempt to circumvent the express provisions of the written
contract ignore this basic and undisputed fact.
C.

The Parol Evidence Rule Bars the Use of
Collateral Statements and Actions to Vary
the Terms of Lynn's Contract with Mower.

Fundamentally, this case is about enforcing the express
terms of a written contract.

Whether the case is approached

through tort, estoppel or other theories, at root Mower is
attempting to disavow the written instrument that the parties
previously agreed represented a complete summation of their
relationship.

None of the facts brought forth by Mower justify

setting aside that contract.

Mower promised that he would be

responsible for obtaining necessary workers' compensation
insurance and promised to indemnify Lynn from any on-the-job
injuries to his employees or to himself.

That express clause

precludes imposing a contradictory duty on defendants.

Rio Alaom

Corp. v. Jimco Ltd.. 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980) ("An express

126196 1
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agreement or covenant relating to a specific contract right
excludes the possibility of an implied covenant of a different or
contradictory nature").
The parol evidence rule is a substantive rule of contract
law designed to protect the ability of parties to memorialize
their agreements in writing, without fear that the whole gamut of
their dealings will be used to change their final agreement. The
Utah Supreme Court has summarized the rule:
When parties have reduced to writing what appears
to be a complete and certain agreement it will be
conclusively presumed, in the absence of fraud,
that the writing contains the whole of the
agreement between the parties; and the parol
evidence of contemporaneous conversations,
representations or statements will not be received
for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms
of the written agreement.
Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266, 270
(1972); accord. Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah
1985) ("Simply stated, the rule operates in the absence of fraud
to exclude contemporaneous conversations, statements, or
representations offered for the purpose of varying or adding to
the terms of an integrated contract").4

4

There is no evidence of fraud here. The only person who
Mower accuses of making misleading statements is Linda Granath, a
friend of Mower's from his prior job. Neither she nor Lynn would
have any motive to mislead Mower about the need to obtain
worker's compensation insurance. On the contrary, such insurance
was important enough to Lynn to cause it to insert an express
(continued...)
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Mower contends that the one-page insurance form was
offered not to change the parties' contract, but to clarify the
manner in which Mower was to fulfill his duty.
sophistry.

This is

Mower's argument necessarily seeks to shift a

contractual duty clearly imposed on Mower over to Lynn, by
arguing that the form constituted a separate agreement.

Such a

construction is directly contrary to the parties' express
acknowledgement that the Lynn/Mower Agreement reflected "the
entire Agreement and understanding between the parties."
Mower seeks to offer evidence of collateral statements and
actions in order to shift an obligation expressly assigned to him
by his written Agreement with Lynn,

On its face, and on the

undisputed factual record, the parties intended the Agreement to
serve as a complete expression of their arrangement.

If the

parol evidence rule (and for that matter, the concept of written
contracts) is to have any vitality, it is the written Agreement
that must control, not Mower's self-serving and subjective
understanding.

4

(...continued)
provision in its contract requiring the contractor to obtain that
insurance for himself. There is no evidence in the record
supporting any intent on Defendants' part to mislead OMower.
Although challenged by Lynn to present such evidence in response
to Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, R. 404, plaintiff
offered none.
126196.1
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT ESTOPPEL IS
UNAVAILABLE TO MOWER AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Rather than dispute that Mower had agreed that he would be

responsible for obtaining workers' compensation insurance, Mower
sought to avoid his Agreement with Lynn by invoking the doctrine
of equitable estoppel.

Contrary to his briefing before this

Court, Mower did not plead any affirmative promissory estoppel
claims; rather, his estoppel theory was presented solely as a
response to Lynn's position that Mower may not impose duties on
Lynn that contradict those duties spelled out in the Agreement.5
It is well established in this state that "it is not for a
court to rewrite a contract improvidently entered into at arm's
length or to change the bargain indirectly on the basis of
supposed equitable principles."

Dalton v. Jerico Constr. Co.,

642 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah 1982) quoted in Hal Taylor Assoc, v.
Unionamerica, Inc.. 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982).

As the Utah

Supreme Court has explained:
The
the
the
for

basic rule of contract interpretation is that
intent of the parties is to be ascertained from
content of the instrument itself, the rationale
the rule being to preserve the sanctity of

5

Nor would the pleading of a promissory estoppel case have
made any difference. Not only would such a theory fail as a
matter of law for lack of reasonable reliance (as discussed
infra), but such a contract would also necessarily require
implying contractual duties contrary to the express Agreement.
Utah courts do not imply such contradictory duties. Rio Alaom v.
Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980).
126196 1

18

written instruments. Each contract provision is to
be considered in relation to all of the others with
a view toward giving affect to all and ignoring
none. It is only when an ambiguity exists which
cannot be reconciled by an objective and reasonable
interpretation of the contract as a whole that a
resort may be had to the use of extrinsic evidence.
Utah Vallev Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981).
Application of the doctrine of estoppel here would deprive the
written contract between the parties of its intended force, and
effect an end run around the parol evidence rule.
A.

As a Matter of Law, Mower Could Not Have
Reasonably Relied on Lynn's Statements
and Actions.

Estoppel requires some action or representation made by
the party to be estopped, inconsistent with a later position, on
which the party asserting estoppel reasonably relies.

Ceco Corp.

v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-970 (Utah 1989).
The undisputed facts of this case, as a matter of law, cannot
support a finding that Mower behaved reasonably in assuming he
had workers' compensation insurance.6
It is undisputed in this case that Mower's three-to-five
minute conversation with a Lynn employee, on which Mower bases
6

The arguments in this section related to reasonable
reliance apply equally to Mower's claims of promissory estoppel
(unpleaded below, but asserted here) as well as his tort claims
of fraud, negligent misrepresentation and his theory of agency.
Amended Complaint, 1 52, 57, & 82. R. 304-307. As stated above,
however, none of those theories has been properly preserved for
appeal.
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his entire case, took place prior to the signing of the contract
between Lynn and Mower.

Defendants' Statement of Undisputed

Facts, R. 398, Mower Deposition, R. 424-428, 432 & 434. Mower's
theory of misrepresentation (the basis for all of his tort and
estoppel claims) is that during this brief conversation, Linda
Granath, in giving him the form with the workers' compensation
blank, somehow committed both Lynn and Alexander to obtain such
insurance for Mower.

Significantly, however, Mower does not

testify that Granath ever said she would obtain such insurance.
He seems to have simply assumed that that was the case from their
brief conversation.

Mower testifies that Granath told him that

getting such a policy through Lynn's carrier would be expensive,
and would require adding a rider to the existing policy.

He does

not testify that Granath ever committed to doing anything more
than faxing in the form with his
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X"-mark on it:

Q. (by Mr. Stone)

When Linda [Granath] told you
that she would have to add a
rider to get you on the
Worker's Compensation policy
that Lynn had for its drivers
what did you say?

A.

Verbatim I don't know. Basically what
I said was: I won't have time to be
dealing with all of this stuff and
operate the truck, so what we're going
to handle at the company let's get it
handled.

Q.

Did she tell you she would get
Worker's Comp?
20

A.

No. I was never told that there would
be a problem with it.

Q.

So how did you leave it with her?

A.

My understanding was that they was
just going to - the - whatever the
increase in Workman's Comp would be
would be billed on with the rest of
the insurance that they were
providing.

Mower Deposition, R. 426-427.

In response to questioning by

counsel for Alexander, Mower elaborated:
Q. (by Mr. Plant)

Did she ever indicate to you
how she was going to add you
onto their policy?

A-

No. The only thing that was indicated
to me is that this paper would go back
to Alexander & Alexander, who
underwrites all of the insurance for I don't know whether it's ConAgra or
strictly for Lynn Transportation, but
that it would be computed through
Alexander & Alexander.

Mower Deposition, R. 433.

Nor did the form submitted suggest

that it would effect workers' compensation insurance for Mower.
It merely indicates "coverage desired," and requests that "any
premiums I may owe the insurance carrier" be deducted from
Mower's checks.

R. 418.

It cannot be construed as either an

application or a binder.
According to Mower, Granath indicated that Lynn
Transportation did not provide workers' compensation insurance
for its independent contractors as opposed to Lynn's drivers and
126196 1
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other employees, and that such a policy, if purchased through
Lynn's insurer "would have to be added" as an expensive "rider"
to the Lynn policy.

Mower Deposition, R. 432. She did not

commit to supplying workers' compensation insurance to Mower.
Mower Deposition, p. 427. At best, she committed only to sending
in the application as filled out by Mower and it is undisputed
that she did just that.

R. 398.

Mower contends that he "assumed" he obtained workers'
compensation insurance by marking a single box on a facsimile
form.

He did not discuss price.

R. 426.

Even though he

admitted that such facts would be important, he testified that he
did not discuss how many employees he was going to have, or the
fact that he wanted coverage for himself, as well.

R. 427, 431.

He claims he never received any certificates for any kind of
insurance.

He spoke with one individual for less than five

minutes concerning all the various forms of insurance necessary
for his trucking business.

By his own admission, this person did

not tell him that she would obtain workers' compensation
insurance for M-T Transport; she told him, according to Mower,
that a rider would have to be created and that "expensive"
premiums would have to be calculated after the "paper work" went
"back to Alexander & Alexander."

Mower Deposition, R. 433.

Mower never received a rider or any other indication that his
126196 1
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insurance was in effect, and he never saw a calculation of
premium.

No reasonable person could "assume," under these

circumstances, that his business had purchased insurance for its
employees and owner.
B.

One Cannot Reasonably Rely on a Statement
Contrary to a Subsequent Integrated Written
Contract.

More importantly, it cannot, as a matter of law, be
reasonable for Mower to rely on statements directly at odds with
the terms of his written contract.

Larson v. Wycoff Co., 624

P.2d 1151 (Utah 1981); Huck v. Huck. 734 P.2d 417 (Utah 1986).
In Larson v. Wycoff Co.. an employee sought insurance
benefits for claims he incurred after becoming a part-time
employee.

His company's insurance handbook stated that such

benefits were only available to full-time employees.

When he

converted from full-time employment to part-time employment, the
company mistakenly continued to pay some benefits. When the
company ultimately stopped paying, the employee argued that the
company should be estopped from denying the continued coverage
under the insurance policy for full-time employees.

The Utah

Supreme Court rejected this argument and upheld the trial court's
summary judgment in favor of the defendants, stating:
A party claiming an estoppel cannot rely on
representations or acts if they are contrary to his
own knowledge of the truth or if he had the means
by which with reasonable diligence he could
126196 1

23

ascertain the true situation. . . . Furthermore,
a determination of the issue of estoppel is not
dependent on the subjective state of mind of the
person claiming he was misled, but rather is to be
based on an objective test, i.e., what would a
reasonable person conclude under the circumstances.
. . . It was not reasonable for plaintiff to rely
on additional payments as assuring the continuation
of his coverage. He did not discuss his status in
relation to employee benefits with anyone in a
position to speak for the company, but he had read
the handbook and knew insurance benefits were
available only to full-time employees. While he
undoubtedly welcomed the payments mistakenly made
by Wycoff, he should have known that he was no
longer eligible and that an error may have been
made.
Id., at 1155-1156.

In the case at bar, after the supposed

misleading representations of Linda Granath, Mower signed a
contract explicitly accepting the sole responsibility for
obtaining workers' compensation insurance for his business. As
in Larson v. Wycoff, it is simply not reasonable for Mower to
have assumed that, notwithstanding the explicit terms of the
contract, Lynn or Alexander would provide this workers'
compensation insurance for him.7

He is charged with knowledge

7

Additional support for this proposition can be found
in Huck v. Huck. 734 P.2d 417, a divorce case in which a husband
contended that the wife was estopped from claiming any interest
in certain real properties acquired by the couple:
Plaintiff points to several occasions when
defendant stated she wanted nothing to do with the
properties and claimed no interest therein.
However, since the prenuptial agreement clearly
(continued...)
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of the provisions of his Agreement.

No one ever told him such

insurance had been obtained, and he could easily have found out
by simple inquiry.
It is significant that in both Huck v. Huck and Larson v.
Wycoff Co., the statements alleged to create an estoppel occurred
after the written agreement between the parties.

Here it is

undisputed that the supposed oral misrepresentations were made
prior to the execution of a written contract.

In such a case,

issues of estoppel are more properly dealt with using traditional
notions of the parol evidence rule and the function of
integration clauses within written contracts.

In any event,

however, in a situation where the supposed representations
creating an estoppel occur prior to a written agreement instead
of subsequent to the agreement, the arguments against application
of estoppel are even stronger than when the reverse is true.
Leaving aside the integrity and purpose of written contracts, how
can one "rely" on an oral statement and then sign a conflicting
written agreement?

Reasonable reliance is plainly doubtful in a

case where inconsistent representations are made after the

7

(...continued)
gave her an interest, plaintiff could not have
reasonably relied on her gratuitous oral
disclaimers.

Id., at 420-21.
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party's written agreement; but after all, such agreements can
conceivably be changed after their execution.

It is

preposterous, however, to claim that one relied on such an
inconsistent statement made prior to the contrary written
contract and later continued to do so even after signing it. To
accept such an argument (absent evidence of active fraud on the
other party's part) would void the effect of the integration
clause agreed to by the parties and contained in the written
Agreement at issue here.
C.

Lynn's Conduct Was Insufficient to Justify
Application of Estoppel.

Furthermore, the undisputed facts in this case do not
justify the application of equitable estoppel, even if the
doctrine were available in the face of a contrary written
agreement. For estoppel to be applied:
The promise or representation relied on must be
sufficiently definite and certain that the
plaintiff acting as a reasonable and prudent person
under the circumstances would be justified in
placing reliance upon it; and in case of
uncertainty or doubt the responsibility is upon the
plaintiff to ascertain the facts before acting upon
it.
Petty v. Qindv Mfg. Corp., 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P.2d 30, 32 (1965).
There is nothing definite about the statements of Linda Granath,
as testified to by Kirk Mower.

126196.1
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evidence demonstrating a representation that is "sufficiently
definite and certain" to justify application of estoppel.
What Mower relied on was his vague assumption that Lynn
would obtain insurance for him.

Based on the three- to five-

minute conversation and a single "X" mark, Mower now contends
that Lynn promised to get him not only workers' compensation
insurance, but also promised to determine that Mower himself
desired to be considered an employee under that policy and take
the affirmative step of notifying both the State Industrial
Commission and the insurance carrier of that desire.

This entire

assumption is made by Mower despite the fact that no one ever
told him they were going to get him workers' compensation
insurance.

Mower Deposition, R. 427. He made these assumptions

notwithstanding the fact that he never discussed whether he, as a
sole proprietor, would be considered an employee, notwithstanding
the fact that he never discussed how many employees he
anticipated having, and notwithstanding the fact that he never
discussed rates or length of term.

Most importantly, he made

this assumption in the face of his express promise to the
contrary, contained in the written contract he signed, that hg
would obtain the workers' compensation insurance required by law.
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D.

Mower's Conduct Precludes Application Of Estoppel.

In addition, application of the doctrine of estoppel
requires that the person invoking estoppel be "without fault."
Masters v. Worslev, 777 P.2d 499, 503 (Utah App. 1989); Morgan v.
Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1976).

In this

case, the undisputed facts demonstrate ample fault on the part of
Mower.

This becomes abundantly clear if, for the purposes of

argument, the Court considers how estoppel might apply against
Mower.

From defendants' standpoint, Mower signed an express

written contract that he would obtain workers' compensation
insurance and indemnify Lynn for any claims for injuries incurred
b- him or his employees in the cc rse of performing the contract.
Mower contends that he reasonably relied on defendants' supposed
representations despite his knowledge of the content of the
contract, the fact that he had never discussed rates, terms, or
number of employees to be covered, and the fact that he never
received any confirmation that he had received workers'
compensation insurance.

Lynn, on the other hand, relied on

Mower's statement by permitting him to drive the truck; it is
undisputed that the contract was an express precondition to Mower
ever carrying a load on Lynn's behalf.

The undisputed facts make

it readily apparent which party should bear the burden of this
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loss—Mower is hardly "without fault" and cannot take refuge in
the doctrine of estoppel.
The terms of the parties' written contract are undisputed.
The vague and inconclusive nature of the representations alleged
to have been made by Defendants are set forth in Mower's
deposition testimony.

It is undisputed that his conversation

lasted less than five minutes.

It is undisputed that no

representative of Lynn ever told Mower that they would obtain
workers' compensation insurance for him.

It is undisputed that

no one discussed how many employees he would have, and that Mower
never mentioned his desire to be covered, as sole proprietor of
his trucking business.

These facts are more than sufficient to

legally preclude the application of estoppel to invalidate the
express terms of the parties' written contract, and to bar
plaintiffs' claims that Mower should be excused from his
contractually-assumed responsibilities.
III.

MOWER'S TORT CLAIMS CANNOT BE MAINTAINED.
Independent of the specific reasons stated above, because

the contract executed by and between Mower and Lynn
Transportation defined the duty regarding the acquisition of
workers' compensation coverage, Mower's alleged causes of action
may only sound in contract.

See Allred v. Brown, 261 Utah Adv.

Rep. 42 (Utah App. 1995); Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 886 P.2d
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92, 101 (Utah App. 1994); Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d
795, 799-800 (Utah 1985).
The parties' contract in this case clearly and
unambiguously defines the duty with respect to the acquisition of
workers' compensation coverage.

That definition, as an element

of the contract, was a bargained-for condition in the
relationship between Mower and Lynn Transportation.

As such, the

Agreement controls and Mower's action is limited to the rights
established by that contract.

Mower's attempt to avoid these

contractual duties by asserting numerous tort claims is
unavailing, given Utah courts' repeated recognition that when
parties define their relationship and duties contractually,
liability with respect to such duties may not lie in tort.8
This distinction between tort and contract law was recently
reemphasized by this Court in Interwest Construction:
In Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701
P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court
addressed the often-blurred distinction between
tort and contract liability. Id. at 799-800. The
Court clarified this distinction by holding that if
8

"In some cases an act or omission resulting in a breach
of contract may also constitute a breach of duty that is not
subsumed by the contract and may thereby give rise to a cause of
action sounding in tort." "[A] party may recover in tort[,
therefore,] for breaches of duties which are independent of
contract terms." Interwest Constr., 886 P.2d at 101 (citation
omitted) (emphasis added). Mower, however, has not plead a
breach of any duty independent of the duties assigned in the
Agreement between Mower and Lynn Transportation.
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parties arrange rights, duties, and obligations
under a contract, any cause of action for breach of
those contractually defined obligations, rights, or
duties lies in contract, not in tort. Id. In the
words of the Court, when "the duties or obligations
of the parties are contractual rather than
fiduciary . . . a breach of those express or
implied duties can give rise only to a cause of
action in contract, not one in tort." Id. at 800.
Interwest Constr., 886 P.2d at 101. See also Allred, 261 Utah
Adv. Rep. at 44 (holding the same with respect to duties defined
in a bailment contract).
The principle expressed in Interwest Construction, Beck
and Allred is not new, it is simply the concept that parties are
free to make choices and define duties and their relationships in
contract - commonly referred to as "freedom of contract."
"[W]here the parties are otherwise competent and
free to make a choice as to the provisions of their
contract, it is fundamental that [the] terms of the
contract made by the parties must govern their
rights and duties."
* * *

The very notion of contract is the consensual
formation of relationships with bargained-for
duties. An essential corollary of the concept of
bargained-for duties is bargained-for liabilities
for failure to perform them.
•

*

•

The effect of confusing the concept of contractual
duties, which are voluntarily bargained for, with
the concept of tort duties, which are largely
imposed by law, would be to nullify a substantial
part of what the parties expressly bargained for-limited liability. . . . No reason appears to
support such a radical shift from bargained-for
126196 1
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duties and liabilities to the imposition of duties
and liabilities that were expressly negated by the
parties themselves when they decided to abandon
their status as legal strangers and define their
relationship by contract. Tort law proceeds from a
long historical evolution of externally imposed
duties and liabilities. Contract law proceeds from
an even longer historical evolution of bargainedfor duties and liabilities. The careless and
unnecessary blanket confusion of tort and contract
would undermine the carefully evolved utility of
both.
Isler v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 749 F.2d 22, 23 (10th Cir. 1984)
(quotations and citations omitted).
It is important to recognize that the damages Mower seeks
in this action are purely economic, rather than direct damages
for his physical injuries.

There is no claim in this case that

Lynn bears any responsibility for Mower's accident and resulting
injuries, or even any claim that Lynn was statutorily required to
provide insurance for Mower's on-the-job injury.

Rather, Mower

contends that Lynn is liable for having failed to provide him
coverage for the possibility of those injuries based on Lynn's
conduct in contracting with Mower.

Accordingly, the duty Mower

claims was breached by Lynn was a duty to provide a purely
economic benefit rather than to exercise care for Mower's
personal safety.

That type of duty is governed by contract law,

and may not be imposed in the abstract under a tort theory.
Maack v. Resource Design and Constr., Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 580
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(Utah App. 1994) .9 Whether Mower characterizes his claims as
contract or tort, Lynn- had no duty to secure the economic benefit
of workers' compensation insurance for him.
Finally, as a practical point, there is simply no room for
recognizing both contract and tort theories in this case.

If the

Agreement is fully enforced, Mower has agreed to indemnify and
hold Lynn harmless from "any claim . . . for any injury . . .
resulting from the performance of this Agreement."

R. 416. It

is undisputed that Mower received his injuries (for which he
seeks compensating benefits) while performing the Agreement with
Lynn; he was hurt when his truck ran off the road while he was
carrying a load on behalf of Lynn.

This being the case, he is

contractually obligated to indemnify Lynn from his own claims.
Success against Lynn on his supposedly separate tort claims only
expands his contractual obligation to indemnify Lynn.

This

result is no surprise; the plain intent of the indemnification
provision, which appears in the same clause as the provision
requiring Mower to obtain workers' compensation insurance, was to
9

"Contract law protects expectancy interests created
through agreement between the parties, while tort law protects
individuals and their property from physical harm by imposing a
duty to exercise reasonable care." Maack v. Resource Design and
Const., Inc.. 875 P.2d 570, 580 (Utah App. 1994). Mower's
theories of non-intentional torts fail because his claim is for
purely economic loss, and such losses are recoverable only
pursuant to contract. Id.; Schafir v. Harricran, 879 P.2d 1384
(Utah App. 1994) .
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shift the entire burden of complying with the workers'
compensation statutes on to Mower, the independent contractor.
If that portion of the Agreement is given its intended effect,
there can be no tort claim by Mower against Lynn based on a
different apportionment of responsibility under those laws.
The Agreement expressly provides that Mower has the duty
to acquire workers' compensation coverage for himself and any
employees that he retains.

This was a bargained-for condition in

the contract, whereby Mower expressly accepted the obligation to
secure workers' compensation coverage with respect to his
relationship with Lynn Transportation, as that relationship was
defined in the contract.

Consequently, any cause of action

regarding the failure to secure workers' compensation coverage is
governed by contract and no cause of action in tort may lie.
Accordingly, all of Mower's tort claims - to the extent they are
premised on the alleged failure to acquire workers' compensation
coverage - were properly rejected by the trial court.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE
BASIS THAT MOWER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO WORKERS' COMPENSATION
BENEFITS.
Even if Lynn and Alexander were somehow obligated to

obtain workers' compensation insurance for Mower's business,
neither of the two injuries alleged by Mower would have resulted
in any benefits under an ordinary workers' compensation insurance
126196.1
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policy.

Accordingly, Defendants are not liable to Mower for any

damages in this action.
Mower acknowledges that he is the sole proprietor of M-T
Transport, and that it was in that capacity that he contracted with
Lynn.
Workers' compensation insurance covers the risk imposed by
law pursuant to the workers' compensation laws.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 31A-1-301(83) (defining "workers' compensation insurance").
Those laws require compensation be provided employees for losses
sustained from injuries or death arising out of and in the course
of an employee's employment.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45. However,

sole proprietors are not ordinarily included within this statute's
coverage:
A partnership or sole proprietorship may elect to
include as an employee under this chapter any partner
of the partnership or the owner of the sole
proprietorship. If a partnership or sole
proprietorship makes this election, it shall serve
written notice upon its insurance carrier and upon
the Commission naming the persons to be covered. No
partner of a partnership or owner of a sole
proprietorship is considered an employee under this
chapter until this notice has been given.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43(3)(a) (emphasis added).

Thus, a sole

proprietor who fails to affirmatively give notice to both the
applicable insurance carrier and the Industrial Commission
identifying himself as a person to be covered does not obtain
coverage for his own injuries.
126196.1

35

Here, it is undisputed that no such notice was given by any
entity to the Industrial Commission or any insurance carrier.

The

single form filled out by Mower makes no mention that Kirk H.
Mower, sole proprietor of M-T Transport, is to be covered by any
workers' compensation insurance supposedly ordered by the form;
moreover, it was never sent or intended to be sent to the
Industrial Commission.
other entity.

No other form was submitted by Mower or any

Nothing in his contract with Lynn required Mower to

make the election to include the sole proprietor within the
coverage of M-T Transport's required policy.

Mower did not discuss

with any representative of Lynn or Alexander whether he, as opposed
to merely his employees, should be covered by the workers'
compensation insurance he desired.
This being the case, workers' compensation insurance would
not have covered Mower's injuries received in his accident on July
28th.

He was the sole proprietor of his business, not an employee

of M-T Transport.

The damages for his medical treatment and

alleged disability would not have been recoverable under an
ordinary workers' compensation insurance policy.

Even if Lynn and

Alexander were obligated to obtain such a policy, they would not be
responsible to compensate Mower for his medical or disability
benefits.

126196.1

36

Mower counters this argument by arguing that defendants
somehow should have known that he wanted to have his own injuries
covered as well as those of his employees.

Mower's arguments

concerning this point are based on a misreading of the parties'
Agreement.

The Agreement requires only workers' compensation

insurance within the limits of state law.

State law does not

require sole proprietors to be insured for their on-the-job
injuries.

Workers' compensation insurance covers employees, but

not the owners of the business unless they opt in.

The Agreement

requires nothing more.
Contrary to Mower's unsupported assertions, the order form
on which Mower relies makes no mention of whether the
"Owner/Operator" referenced on the form is to be covered under any
workers' compensation policy, as opposed to merely the business's
employees.

And Mower's arguments below that Defendants were

obligated to provide notice to the insurance carrier and the
Commission on his behalf stretches Mower's theory to the point of
absurdity.

Mower has pointed to no evidence to counter the

undisputed fact that Mower never discussed how many employees he
anticipated employing and never discussed whether he, as opposed to
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merely his employees, would be covered under this supposed
policy.10
The North Carolina case cited by Mower, Garrett v. North
Carolina Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 249 S.E.2d 808 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978)
is therefore plainly inapposite.

In that case, a partner in the

business had specifically requested that he be covered under the
policy, and premiums were calculated and collected from him based
on that request.

None of these elements are present in this case.

Similarly, Mower's argument on appeal that he was unable to
notify the insurance carrier until he was provided with a policy
10

Plaintiffs submitted the affidavits of a supposed
insurance "expert," Jerry Anderegg, who purported to testify that
it is the insurance agent's duty to inform the insurance carrier
that the owner is to be insured as a worker. The trial court
granted defendants' Motions To Strike Anderegg's Affidavits.
Mower has not briefed or identified any issue in this appeal
arguing that the granting of those Motions to Strike was
improper. Even if the Court were inclined to review that
decision, however, the Court can reject Anderegg's unsupported
testimony out of hand. Anderegg's conclusory testimony that it
is the insurance agent's "duty" to notify the insurance carrier
that the sole proprietor's injuries are to be covered is directly
contrary to Utah statutory law. The statute requires that the
sole proprietorship "shall serve written notice upon its
insurance carrier and upon the commission naming the person to be
covered." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43 (3) (a). The insurance agent
is the carrier's agent, not Mower's; the statute requires the
sole proprietorship to serve the notice on the carrier. Anderegg
appears to contend that the insurance carrier was obligated to
serve the notice on itself. Oral, or implied notice, as argued
here by plaintiffs, simply fails to meet the limiting terms of
the statute. Anderegg's opinion cannot change express statutory
duties imposed by the Utah Legislature on Mower.
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misses the point.

First, his ignorance of the identity of the

carrier does not excuse him from his failure to notify the
Industrial Commission.

He certainly knew or should have known of

that entity's location.

Second, this argument fails to accommodate

the necessary implications of Mower's theory of reliance.

He

claims that he thought workers' compensation insurance had been
obtained.

Amended Complaint, f 25, R 301 ("The acts of defendants

and each of them caused Mower to believe that he carried workers'
compensation insurance as required by law and by the contract").
That being the case, Mower has no excuse for failing to notify the
appropriate entities of his desire to opt in, as a sole proprietor,
to the workers' compensation system.

Alternatively, if he thought

he was still waiting for Defendants to supply him with a policy, he
had no business driving.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENTERED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF LYNN ON LYNN'S CLAIM FOR INDEMNITY.
Mower did not contest any of the statements of material

undisputed facts submitted by Lynn in support of its motion for
summary judgment on its counterclaims.

Significantly, Mower did

not contest, by way of affidavit or citation to any other material
in the record undisputed Fact No. 2:
2.
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On or about July 28, 1990, Mower was injured in
an accident while driving his tractor-trailer in
the course of performing the Contractor
Operating Agreement between Lynn and Mower. At
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the time, Mower was hauling a load for Lynn and
was injured when his truck ran off the road.
Mower did not contest the reasonableness of the attorneys'
fees sought by Lynn in any fashion.

Instead, he confined his

arguments to whether the indemnification clause contained in the
Agreement applied in this case.

In short, Mower contended that

because he characterized his claims asserted in this lawsuit as not
arising out of the contract, the contractual language does not
apply.
The contractual language, however, is clear:
CONTRACTOR [Mower] agrees to protect, defend,
indemnify, and hold CARRIER [Lynn] harmless from and
against any claim, loss or damage brought or alleged
by CONTRACTOR or its employees against CARRIER for
any injury, including death, to CONTRACTOR or its
employees resulting from the performance of this
Agreement.
Contractor Operating Agreement (Exhibit A to Mower's Amended
Complaint), % 9(b). R. 416.

As is plain from the above

language, Mower's duty to indemnify Lynn is not limited to claims
brought under the contract.

It encompasses "any claim, loss or

damage" for "any injury . . . resulting from the performance of
this Agreement."

The only question is whether the injury arose out

of the Agreement's performance, not whether the claim is based on
the Agreement.

It is undisputed that Mower's injury occurred while

he was performing this Agreement.

126196.1

40

Mower's argument that the duty to indemnify applies only to
claims brought under the Agreement is not only unsupported by the
grammar of the clause, but its breadth as well.

The duty applies

to claims alleged by Mower's employees, who are presumably not
parties to this Agreement and would not be able to assert rights
under it. A claim by such an employee would therefore not be
brought under the Agreement, but would plainly be covered by the
clause.
The context of the indemnification clause also supports the
trial court's ruling.

It is found in the same paragraph as, and

immediately follows, the provision requiring Mower to obtain
workers' compensation insurance.

It is clear from the Agreement

that the parties intended that Mower assume the entire burden of
complying with applicable workers' compensation laws and paying for
any workplace injury occurring to Mower or his employees. The
function of the indemnification clause was to protect Lynn from any
responsibility for these duties.

Plainly, part of the liability

Lynn was seeking to avoid was that which might flow from a failure
by Mower to obtain workers' compensation insurance, and claims that
employees of Mower eligible for workers' compensation benefits
might attempt to make as a result against Lynn.

See Utah Code Ann.

§ 35-1-42(6) (a) (defining statutory employers).

In fact, Mower did

fail to get such insurance.
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As a result, h§, now seeks to recover
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the value of workers' compensation benefits from Lynn. Mower's
claims in this case are exactly the type of claims intended by the
parties to fall within Mower's indemnification obligation.
It is undisputed that the injury in this case arose out of
the performance of the Agreement.

Mower was driving a load for

Lynn at the time of his alleged injury.
which he seeks compensation.

It is that injury for

The Agreement requires Mower to

indemnify Lynn for any claim brought against Lynn for such an
injury.
The amounts due under the indemnity provision and Lynn's
other counterclaims11 were not disputed.

Mower is obligated to

pay his account and to honor his commitment to indemnify Lynn. The
trial court properly entered summary judgment on Lynn's
counterclaims.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment to
Defendants.

Lynn's contract with Mower spells out Mower's and

Lynn's respective duties. Mower raised no issue of fact, and did
not even contest, Defendants' arguments that the Agreement was

11

Mower stipulated that judgment could be entered in the
amount of $1,871.69 on Lynn's claim on its account with Mower.
In addition, Mower stipulated to the reasonableness of the
attorney's fees and costs under the indemnity provisions, and
contested only Lynn's contractual rights to claim them from
Mower.
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integrated.

Contrary duties cannot be implied under contract or

estoppel principles.
Tort theory also cannot alter Lynn's and Mower's contractual
allocation of the duty to obtain workers' compensation insurance
for Mower's business.

Mower abandoned all of his tort claims other

than negligence, and that theory, like the others, cannot be
reconciled with the parties' Agreement respecting the duty to
obtain coverage.

Moreover, Mower agreed to indemnify Lynn for this

type of claim, so a tort theory nets him nothing from Lynn.
Mower was a sole proprietor who never opted to be covered by
the workers' compensation system.

As such, even if Lynn had

obtained a workers' compensation policy on his behalf, Mower would
not have been eligible for the benefits which he seeks in this
action.

He has not been damaged by Lynn's supposed failure to

obtain workers' compensation insurance on his behalf.
Finally, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment
on Lynn's counterclaims.

The amount of those claims was not in

dispute; the legal entitlement to the bulk of them was correctly
decided in Lynn's favor.

Mower agreed to indemnify Lynn from the

claims he asserts in this action.
The Court should affirm the trial court's order in all
respects.
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